Tuesday, September 23, 2014

Army of the Cumberland




As another Lame Cherry exclusive in matter anti matter.


Things do not matter and yet they always matter.

- Lame Cherry


One of my favorite generals is a general forgotten mostly in history except for the charges "he was slow". The reason I delve into the history of General Thomas of the Army of the Cumberland in the American Civil War is due to the reality that he was castigated, then praised, then outed and then made excuse for in the rewriting of his history as it affected the operations in Tennessee in the last days of the war.

I will effect in this a comparison to another colleague in General Philip Sheridan, who served with General Thomas in operations, and sustained high casualty counts, before  being put at the head of the Army of the Shenandoah to defeat General Jubal Early, after Sheridan's Cavalry had ridden behind General Lee's lines and whipped General Stuart's Cavalry in killing him in battle.

General Thomas is one of my favorites not for his success nor failure, but for the way he was mistreated after the war, in he was not given a position of honor in the political gratutities, but instead was insulted by a post of low esteem.
He groused about this to General Sherman, and the literal slap at him is what killed the man, as he had felt so humiliated.

When General Thomas was part of the Army which held General Sherman, General Sherman suffered severely in casualties as it was horrid combat in those series of Southern battles.
Thomas did prove slow, but it was not from not performing his duty, but he was paying attention to details.

One must comprehend that most armies are not all sprite men and full stores. Most armies are sick, broken down with everything in short supply, including good weather. It is those generals who can win with the forces available to them who are the generals who are remembered.

The defense of General Thomas is that General Sherman depleted his stores, his men, his cavalry and left him with the trash. To this General Thomas was to face the competent General Hood in Tennesee.

The backdrop of this was anxiety in Washington and City Point that Hood would cross into Ohio causing all sorts of problems. The reason for this diversion would be to save the South and General Lee's Army which was in the trenches at Petersburg with General Grant hemming Lee in.

Wars are never isolated things. This is why Lincoln, Stanton, Grant and Sherman were pressing for Thomas to attack Hood, so as to keep the political and military disaster from taking place.
It makes no difference if General Thomas was short on supplies and men, as almost every other commander was too.

I use General Sheridan in the Shenandoah as an example. The fight against General Early was hard and costly. Sheridan had numbers of his Cavarly dismounted, but he still was using them to fight on foot. Just because a Cavarly is shed of horses, does not mean it does not exist as a fighting force.
To this General Thomas wanted to wait in attacking General Hood, for the reason that his Cavalry of around 12000 would then be all mounted and able to attack Hood swiftly in flank, and to smash General Nathan Beford Forest's fine Cavalry.

General Sheridan in his victory, marched his Army toward Grant's at Petersburg, and it was not in full force. At Petersburg, he was employed to move on Lee's right flank.
General Sheridan requested "his" 6th Infantry as they were fine men, but was not given the 6th after protest, but afforded the 5th whose commander in General Warren was slow to the battle too.

In the Cumberland an ice storm was to keep General Thomas from deploying. In Petersburg a rain storm which buried wagons to axels and sank horses to their bellies, had General Grant listening to his officers to delay, until General Sheridan rode up and convinced General Grant that they had to attack or be maligned with another "mud campaign" and face political ramifications.

Sheridah leveraged Lee's right, got the Army of Virginia out of their trenches, and then received Pickett's attack which was blunted, all with being deprived of General Wilson and further reinforcements.

The reason General Wilson is brought up is that General Wilson was then with General Thomas, and would upon resupply conduct a brilliant campaign finishing off General Forest at Selma, and marching into Georgia in finishing off the last of the South's manufacturing base.

General Thomas was slow, but he was slow when others did have to take chances, and slow when striking General Hood even in destroying his own forces would mean the Ohio free, more pressure on Lee and greater enthusiasm for Grant and Sherman's Armies.

Sometimes a military division is used up with it's trash in order to use up another enemy army which it is more expedient to destroy then, instead of allowing it to remain as hope for other armies as in Johnston's and Lee's.
This may sound cruel, but it is war and in war people are put into the fight for a great objection to win.

There is no doubt that the re arming, reinforcing and re supply of General Thomas' Army of the Cumberland was a great feat. It does not though bar the facts that General Grant was going to relieve Thomas for inaction and take command of this Army personally to prosecute that front.
Grant, Sherman and Sheridan would have all been expected to prosecute a battle and victory with those  resources and that is what General Thomas was expected to accomplish, even if depleted by General Sherman's march.

As an example in the events leading to Appomatox, General Sheridan moved his Cavalry and 6th Infantry to cut off General Lee's flight. He engaged at Sailor's Creek, General Ewell in a sharp fight. Sheridan did not stop though and was busy probing for Lee's front after destroying his rear gaurd.
This was done while General Meade, an absolute stick in the mud was counter marching to a place Lee had been and left.
The point being in combat, a general attacks with what he has, by bringing to bear the most concentrated force on the best ground. At Chikamauga, General Sheridan was savaged in having the worst casualties, but he and his men attacked and held, because it was all that could be done.

The question with General George Thomas was not that he was slow. He was slow in previous battles and that deliberation is what vexed his superiors. He also was prepared if allowed time, which Tennessee was not allowed. By evidence, his Cumberland Army was deemed a military and political sacrifice which none would admit to, and which Thomas did not seem to comprehend.

General Thomas in taking time, and having an ice storm to gain 3 days time, whipped General Hood in shattering his Army. This then allowed General Wilson who had lost 6000 more horses in the vigorous campaign against Hood to drive into Alabama in pulling the rations and armament supply from the Confederacy.
That credit he deserves, but he also deserves the reality he was deliberately slow to protect his Soldiers, when politics demanded they be used up.

For this, General Thomas would pay for later under the President Johnson Administration, even if Sec. of War Stanton praised him for the victory in the "winners" were not going to share the spoils of victory with him.
Thomas' command was supposed to die for Ohio and not live for the Union.

All of this requires publication, so this arguement can end. The only thing assessed further is that one malcontent in General Thomas' Cumberland Army should have died under the command of another boy General in Wilson.
Captain Benteen is listed in the ranks of Wilson's Cavalry which outflanked Hood, and then finished off Forest in Alabama. Benteen would later finish off General Custer and his command at the Little Big Horn in that intrigue which followed later in the Indian Wars.
Benteen was another brave Trooper, but amounting to a psychopath in his hatred of "command" which one wonders stemmed from the lack of acknowledgement of Thomas and the Wilson campaign, while General Sheridan and General Custer in gained the glory.

It is just some of those things in the interconnecting dots none have ever examined as none ever assess the entire field and only fixate on points of battle.


nuff said


agtG 307Y